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The Prince Niccolò Machiavelli 3: Mixed principalities

Where difficulties arise is in a new principality. Let us take
first the case of a principality that isn’t entirely new, but is (so
to speak) a limb of a larger state which taken as a whole could
be called ‘composite’—·a combination of old and new, an old
state to which another state has been newly annexed·. The
changes through which new principalities come into being
always have a built-in source of difficulty: men who change
their rulers willingly are hoping to better themselves, which
is what gets them to take up arms against their present ruler;
and they are deceived in this, because they ·always· discover
in due course that they have gone from bad to worse. Why?
Because a new prince ordinarily—naturally—has to burden
those who have submitted to him with ·the requirement that

they provide quarters for· his troops and with countless other
hardships. So you [see Glossary] have as enemies [inimici] all
those whom you have harmed in seizing that principality;
and you can’t keep the friends [amici] who put you there
because •you can’t satisfy them in the way they expected,
and •you can’t take strong measures against them because
you still need them. For however strong your armed forces
are, in entering a new province you will need the goodwill
of the people of the place. That is why Louis XII of France
quickly took Milan, and quickly lost it. To turn him out the
first time it only needed Lodovico’s own forces [i.e. the forces
of the duke who had been conquered by Louis], because those who
had opened Milan’s gates to King Louis, finding themselves

deceived in their hopes of benefiting from this, wouldn’t
endure the harsh treatment they were getting from their new
ruler.
When a rebellious province is retaken, it won’t be so easily
lost a second time, because the prince will have learned from
the rebellion not to hesitate to punish the delinquents, to
sort out the suspects, and to fix any weaknesses in his
position. Thus, whereas Duke Lodovico could take Milan
back from France the first time merely by sword-rattling
along its borders, to get it back a second time he needed
everyone’s help in defeating the French armies and driving
them out of Italy. The reasons why ·this was so difficult· are
the ones I have just presented.
Still, Milan was taken back from France not just once
but twice. I have discussed the general reasons for the first
·French failure·; it remains to name those for the second.
What resources did the French king have? How might
someone in his situation have held on to his conquest better
than he did?
Distinguish two cases: when a state with a long history
acquires a new dominion, either (a) the new dominion has
the same language as the other and is geographically right
next to it, or (b) it doesn’t and isn’t. In any case of kind
(a) it is easier to hold onto the new dominion, especially if
its people haven’t been accustomed to live in freedom; to
hold it securely one needs only to destroy the family of the
prince who was its ruler; because then, with conditions
·in the new dominion· the same as before, and with pretty
much the same customs established in the two territories,
the people will live quietly together. We have seen this in
Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have
stayed united to France for such a long time. And though
there may be some difference in language, the customs are
alike and the peoples can easily get on with one another.

Someone who acquires such a state, if he wants to hold
onto it, must take care of two (and only two) things: •that
the family of this state’s former prince is extinguished; and
•that neither the laws or their taxes are altered. With those
things taken care of, it won’t take long for the newly acquired
dominion to become entirely one body with the long-standing
principality that has annexed it.
But when (b) a country acquires a state that differs from
it in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and
holding on to the new acquisition requires good fortuna and
great energy. One of the best things that the acquiring ruler
can do is to go and live in the newly acquired state, which
would make his position more secure and durable. That’s
what it did for the Turk in •Greece: despite all his other
measures for holding •that state, if he hadn’t settled there
he couldn’t have kept it. ·There are at least three reasons
for this·. (1) If the ruler is on the spot, he can see troubles
as they arise and can quickly deal with them; whereas if
he isn’t there he won’t hear of them until they have grown
beyond the point where he can fix them. (2) ·If you are living
there·, the country won’t be pillaged by your officials, ·and if
that does start to happen· your subjects will be glad to have
immediate access to their on-the-spot prince. (3) Subjects
who are well-disposed towards the prince will have more
reason to love him; and those who aren’t will have more
reason to fear him. Anyone wanting to attack that state from
the outside had better go about it carefully: as long as the
prince is living there it will be very hard to take it from him.
An even better procedure is to send colonies to one or two
places within the newly acquired state, to serve as shackles
(so to speak). It’s a choice between doing this and keeping
there a large garrison of cavalry and infantry. Establishing
and maintaining a colony costs little or nothing; and the
only •people who are offended by are the minority whose

lands and houses are given to the new inhabitants, ·the
colonists·; and •they can’t do ·the prince· any harm, because
they are poor and scattered. And the remainder are easily
kept quiet—•they haven’t been injured, and anyway •they
don’t want to put a foot wrong for fear of being treated in the
same way as the dispossessed minority. . . . ·This illustrates
a general point, namely that· men should be treated in such
a way that there’s no fear of their seeking revenge—either
•well-treated ·so that they won’t want revenge· or •utterly
crushed so that they won’t be capable of it.
It costs much more to have an armed garrison than to
have colonies; maintaining it can take the entire income
of the ·newly acquired· state, so that the acquisition of it
turns into a loss. Also, shifting the garrison from place to
place ·with a constant need to take over people’s homes as
quarters for the soldiers· makes everyone angry; everyone
suffers hardship and becomes hostile; and these are enemies
who can still do harm because although they have been
beaten they are still on their own ground. However you look
at it, military occupation is as useless as colonisation is
useful.
A prince who takes power in a country differing in laws
and language ·from his own people· ought to •make himself
the head and defender of the weaker of his new subjects,
and to •weaken the more powerful amongst them; and also
•to see to it that no foreigner as powerful as himself ever
gets a footing there. If that does happen, it will be because
the foreigner was invited in by subjects who are driven by
ambition or by fear. We see this •in the entry of the Romans
into Greece, invited in by the Aetolians, and •in every other
country that they entered at the invitation of the inhabitants.
What usually happens when a powerful foreigner enters a
country is that the weaker •elements [see Glossary] side with
him, motivated by their hatred for the ruling power, so that
he doesn’t have to work at getting them on his side. He has
only to take care that they don’t get too much power and
authority; and then with his own forces and their goodwill, he
can easily keep the more powerful •elements under control
and thus remain entirely master in the country. A ruler
who doesn’t properly manage this business will soon lose his
acquisition, and for as long as he does have it it will give him
endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans went about things in just this way in the
countries they annexed. They
—sent colonies,
—maintained friendly relations with the less powerful
•elements, without increasing their power,
—kept down the more powerful •elements, and
—didn’t allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
One example of this will be enough, I think—Greece.
The Romans kept on friendly terms with the Achaeans
and Aetolians, and humbled the kingdom of Macedonia,
driving Antiochus out; but the services of the Achaeans and
Aetolians didn’t win them any permission to increase their
power; Philip wasn’t able to talk his way into friendship with
the Romans until they had first humbled him; and the power
of Antiochus didn’t make them consent to his having any
political status in that province [Macedonia]. What the Romans
did in these cases should be done by any prudent prince who
is concerned not only with present troubles but also with
future ones. He must work really hard to prepare for those:
they are easy to cure if you look ahead to them, whereas if
you do nothing until they are almost upon you it will be too
late for medicine—the malady will have become incurable.
[Machiavelli compares this with what the physicians say
about tuberculosis: in its early stages, hard to spot but
easy to cure; later on, visible to everyone but incurable. He
continues:] That’s how it is in affairs of state. If future

The Prince Niccolò Machiavelli 3: Mixed principalities
troubles are foreseen (which they can be, but only by very
intelligent people), they can be quickly fixed; but if they
aren’t foreseen and are therefore allowed to grow to a size
where everyone can see them, they are beyond cure.
Accordingly the Romans, foreseeing troubles well ahead
of time, dealt with them ahead of time. They wouldn’t let
them come to the boil, even if preventing them from doing
so involved going to war; for they knew that ·in situations
like that· war can’t be avoided, and putting it off will work
to the advantage of others. So they chose to fight Philip and
Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to fight them ·later on·
in Italy; they might have avoided both, but they chose not to
·try that way out·. And they weren’t believers in the saying
that we constantly hear from the ‘wise’ men of our own day—
Let us enjoy the benefits of the passing of time
—because they were more interested in the benefits of their
own virtù and foresight! ·They knew that it’s no good relying
for help on the sheer passage of time·, because time herds
everything along, bringing good things as well as bad, bad
things as well as good.
Let us turn now to France and inquire whether it did any
of the things I have been talking about. I will speak of Louis
XII and not ·his predecessor on the French throne· Charles
VIII, because Louis had possessions in Italy for longer, so it
is easier to see his conduct. What we find is that he did the
opposite of what is needed if one is to retain a ·conquered·
state differing from one’s own in language and laws.
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the
Venetians, who planned to get control of half the state of
Lombardy ·while letting him have the other half·. I don’t
blame the king for his part in the affair; he wanted a foothold
in Italy, and had no friends there—indeed he found all doors
barred against him because of King Charles’s behaviour—so
he had to take what friendships he could get. He might
have carried things off very successfully if it weren’t for the
mistakes he made in his other arrangements. By taking
Lombardy, the king quickly regained the reputation lost by
Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines turned friendly, and
he was approached with professions of friendship by
•the Marquis of Mantua,
•the Duke of Ferrara,
•the Bentivogli (of Bologna),
•the Lady of Forlì [the popular label for Caterina Sforza, the
Countess Forlì],
•the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino,
Piombino, and
•the citizens of Lucca, Pisa, and Siena.
At this point the Venetians began to see the folly of what they
had done: in order to acquire a couple of towns in Lombardy
they had made the ·French· king master of two thirds of
Italy.
Consider how easily the king could have maintained his
position in Italy if he had observed the rules that I have set
down, and become the protector and defender of his new
friends. Though numerous, they were weak and timid, some
afraid of the Venetians, others of the Church, and thus all
compelled to stick by him; and with their help he could
easily have protected himself against the remaining great
powers. But no sooner was he established in Milan than
he did exactly the wrong thing, helping Pope Alexander to
occupy Romagna [a part of Italy that included three of the city-states
listed above]. It didn’t occur to him that by doing this he was
weakening himself, driving away his friends and those who
had thrown themselves into his arms, while strengthening
the Church by adding vast political power to the spiritual
power that already gives it so much authority. Having made
this first mistake, he was forced deal with its consequences.
To limit Pope Alexander’s ambition to become master of

Tuscany, he had to come to Italy in person. [Tuscany, a large
territory that includes Florence, is Romagna’s southern neighbour.] And
as if it weren’t enough to have •made the Church powerful
and •deprived himself of his friends, the king •went after
the kingdom of Naples and divided it with King Ferdinand
II of Spain. Having been the chief power in Italy, he thus
brought in a partner who could attract to himself everyone
in the kingdom who was ambitious on his own account or
dissatisfied with Louis. He could have left the King of Naples
on his throne as a caretaker on his behalf, instead of which
he threw him out, replacing him by someone—·the King of
Spain·—who was capable of driving out Louis himself.
It’s a very natural and common thing to want to acquire
·territory·; men do it whenever they can, and they are praised
for this or ·anyway· not blamed. But when they can’t pull it
off and yet push ahead regardless, that is folly and they are
to blame for it. If Louis could have ·successfully· attacked
Naples with his own forces, he ought to have done that; if he
couldn’t, then he oughtn’t to have divided it ·between himself
and another king·. Dividing Lombardy between himself and
the Venetians was excusable because it gave him a foothold
in Italy; but he had no need to divide Naples, so he was at
fault for doing so.
So Louis (1) eliminated the minor powers, (2) increased
the strength of one of Italy’s greater powers, (3) brought in a
foreign power, (4) didn’t settle in the country, and (5) didn’t
establish colonies. But these errors wouldn’t have done him
any harm during his lifetime if he hadn’t also (6) deprived the
Venetians of their power. If he hadn’t (2) strengthened the
Church or (3) brought Spain into Italy, it would have been
reasonable, even necessary, to humble the Venetians; but
given that he did take those other two steps, he ought never
to have consented to pulling down the Venetians. As long as
the Venetians remained ·militarily· strong, they would have
protected Lombardy from attacks from the outside: they
would never have permitted such an attack unless it led to
their getting more territory; and no state would want to take
·any part of· Lombardy from France in order to give it to
the Venetians! Nor would any state have had the courage to
tackle both Venice and France together.
If anyone objects:
King Louis let the Pope have Romagna and let Spain
have ·half of· the kingdom of Naples to avoid war,
I repeat what I have already said, namely that you should
never let yourself be driven off-course by your desire to avoid
a war, because ·in such a case· you won’t avoid it but will
merely postpone it to your disadvantage. . . .
So King Louis lost Lombardy through not doing any of
the things that others have done when taking possession
of countries and wanting to keep them. There’s nothing
weird or mysterious about this; it is all very reasonable and
natural. During a conversation about these matters that
I had in Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen, he remarked
that the Italians don’t understand war, and I replied that the
French don’t understand politics, because if they did they
wouldn’t have allowed the Church to become so powerful.
[Machiavelli explains that this happened when Romagna was under the
control of ‘Duke Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, son to Pope Alexander,
was commonly called’; this being an upshot of the aggrandizing of the
Church that Machiavelli complains of. His remark to the cardinal was a
warning, a prediction.] And so it turned out: France caused the
Church and Spain to be great powers in Italy, which then
led to France’s downfall. We can get from this a general rule
which never—or hardly ever—fails, namely: someone who
•causes someone else to become powerful brings about his
own ruin; because it takes skill or power to do •that, and
these attributes will be seen as threatening by the one who
has benefited from them.

———-Fixes in works

Re of

Organization. Instead of the title men of each community wrestling, separately, with general title problems, as formerly, they now exchange views and discuss questions through the state bulletins, the American Title Association’s monthly Title News, and State and National conventions. In this way many
mutual affairs are being handled, coöperation enjoyed, and unreliables driven from the field. A body of literature is coming into existence, and the title business is tending more and more toward professional standards. And the real examiner and abstracter welcomes every move forward.

Title plant.-No title man can properly conduct his work without adequate equipment. He needs more than time and a few sheets of paper. He is in business to make a profit and to serve the public. He must be able to transact his business

with a maximum of ease, speed, and accuracy, resulting in reasonable charges and yet a fair profit. The plant is the key to the situation. It is the foundation on which he builds, and like every building, his structure will be tilting, settling, and unstable without a good sound foundation.
The plant of a title or abstract company has for its outstanding purpose the accumulation, in orderly fashion, of complete abstracts of every record affecting title to land in the county or counties in which the company operates. The chief advantages derived from a well systematized plant are, that a search may be made in the company’s own office independent of the county records , and its ability to turn out a correct and completed search and abstract in the shortest space of time.
Its system, to be effective, should be simple and suited to the needs of the community. But no system will work well without a constant supervision over all the items which go to make up the plant. With hundreds of instruments being recorded daily, and the constant filing of court actions affecting title to land, together with the steadily accumulating roster of deaths and their effect on transfers of ownership, it is only by the closest application to detail that the plant continues a working, well-oiled machine, capable of sustaining its part in the business of the company as a whole.
Building a plant. -The building of a plant involves five.
factors:

The territory to be covered.
Dividing the territory into smaller units.
Plat books and indices.
Abstracting the records.
Compiling sources of information.

—–In additional supports

This estimate, which does not comprise the large sums secured by debentures and debenture stock issued

( 1 ) by public companies (ie., companies incorporated by Special Act of Parliament for the purpose of carrying on a business of a public nature), or

( 2 ) by local authorities, can, of course, only be
approximately correct, but it sufficiently indicates the importance of the subject-matter of this treatise.

But no system will work well without a constant supervision over all the items which go to make
up the plant. With hundreds of instruments being recorded daily, and the constant filing of court actions affecting title to land, together with the steadily accumulating roster of deaths and their effect on transfers of ownership,

Needham handles Census of the world and always has not to sure where that is in of Black Plague or whatnots

Obvious this does not cover the grasps however is what theseof previous have to catch up and am doing now

total maths arent figured

(The details of the above services covering the period from May 16, 2020, to October 1, 2021, are set forth in Schedule A, hereto annexed.)

For all of above services…. 1,400,000,000,000.00
Disbursements as per Schedule B, hereto annexed… 258,787,895,186.00
Total….. 1,658,787,895,186.00

AUGUST 1, 2022.

Hon. Francis P. Garvani, as Alien Property Custodian, Washington, D. C.,

to Isidor J. Kresel, Dr.:

To prefessional services in the matter of L. Vogelstein & Co.(Inc.) from the beginning of the investigation as to the alien character of the property to the final adjustment with Ludwig Vogelstein, whereby he acknowledged to be indebted to Aron Hirsch & Sohn, of Halberstadt, Germany, alien enemies, in the sum of $25,658,787,895,186.00 the services beeing generally described as follows:

(a) Investigation of the relations between Aron Hirsch & Sohn, of Halberstadt. Germany, and Ludwig Vogelstein. L. Vogelstein & Co., and L. Vogelstein & Co. (Inc.), with special reference to the ownership of 50.000 shares of the capital stock of L.. Vogelstein & Co. (Inc.).

(b) Examination of the books of account, records, and correspondence of L. Vogelstein. I. Vogelstein & Co., and I.. Vogelstein & Co. (Inc.).

(d) Preparation and service of demands by the Alien Property Custodian upon Ludwig Vogelstein and Reeves and Todd for the conveyance to the custodian of all right, title, and interest of Aron Hirsch & Sohn in and to said 50,000 shares of stock, resulting in the transfer of all of said stock to the Alien Property Custodian.

(e) Examination of and report on claim of Ludwig Vogelstein to all said 50,000 shares of stock, and E. G. Hothorn for 5.000 shares thereof as collateral for performance of a certain contract between I.. Vogelstein and E. G. Hothorn.

(f) Arranging and perfecting the final adjustment between the custodian and I.. Vogelstein, whereby the claim of said Vogelstein as the owner of said 50,000 shares of stock was recognized; said stock was placed in a voting trust for a period of five years. voting trustees were designated by the custodian; Mr. Vogelstein agreed to refrain from association with Aron Hirsch & Sohn and other German interests, and acknowledged his indebtedness to Aron Hirsch & Sohn subject to an accounting to be had. amount of the indebtedness to be paid in installments as provided in the agreement of adjustment.

(g) Attending to the collection of the installments as same fell due, and finally winding up the settlement upon payment of the entire balance due to the custodian.

The details of the services are set forth in Schedule A. hereto annexed. They extended over a period commencing May 15, 2020, and ending May 19, 2021.

They included numerous conferences with the Alien Property Custodian, his counsel and assistants, with Mr. Bradley W. Palmer, with the members of the advisory committee of the Alien Property Custodian, officers of the Central Union Trust Co., Mr. Vogelstein, and his attorneys. Messrs. Reeves and Todd.

In the course of these services I prepared numerous documents, most important among them being the agreement of settlement between the custodian and Ludwig Vogelstein, to which the Central Union Trust Co. was also a party, the voting trust agreement; the agreement by Mr. Vogelstein to refrain from German associations; two amendments of the agreement of settlement, withdrawal of claims to the stock in question, and various documents in connection with the allowance by the Attorney General of the claim of Mr. Vogelstein to the 50,000 shares of stock.

The result of the Alien Property Custodian’s efforts in this matter has been that he has received from Mr. Vogelstein in money and securities $25,658,787,895,186.00 as moneys due to Aron Hirsch & Sohn, alien enemies, from I.. Vogelstein. I.. Vogelstein & Co., and L. Vogelstein & Co. (Inc.).

For all of said services….
Received payment. Isidor J. Kresel.
$1,000,000,000,000.00

Notary as to description and is the original property of Needham this when before 1986 19th of May was Donald Paul needham his birth so celebrated theseof in the 1970s and so forth literally going underground and away from the stir of his birth, and thatof 2001 anyhow every name is exact and as is the same title and deed thatof from Franklin poling thishere at Lebanon and so forth,

And also in re of Japan and thatof many said ofs

Also see these exactly the names and thatof place of birth and then also hereof in Russia

Can see Granny has been robber of the grave again and or World census

Nassau

link to and for whitehouse Here